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The International Space Station (ISS) currently provides potable water dispensing for 
rehydrating crewmember food and drinking packages. There is one system located in the United 
States On-orbit Segment (USOS) and one system in the Russian Segment. Shuttle mission STS-126 
delivered the USOS Potable Water Dispenser (PWD) to ISS on ULF2; subsequent activation 
occurred on November 2008. The PWD is capable of supporting an ISS crew of six, but nominally 
supplies only half this crew size. The PWD design provides incremental quantities of hot and 
ambient temperature potable water to US food and beverage packages. PWD receives iodinated 
water from the US Water Recovery System (WRS) Fuel Cell Water Bus, which feeds from the 
Water Processing Assembly (WPA). The PWD removes the biocidal iodine to make the water 
potable prior to dispensing. A heater assembly contained within the unit supplies up to 2.0 L of hot 
water (65 to 93 °C) every 30 min. During a single meal, this quantity of water supports three to four 
crewmembers’ food rehydration and beverages. The unit design has a functional life expectancy of 
10 years, with replacement of limited life items, such as filters. To date, the PWD on-orbit 
performance is acceptable. Since activation of the PWD, there were several differences between on-
orbit functionality and expected performance of hardware design. The comparison of on-orbit 
functionality to performance of hardware design is discussed for the following key areas: 1) 
microbial contamination, 2) no-dispense and water leakage scenarios, and 3) under-dispense 
scenarios.  
Nomenclature 
ADC =  Analog to Digital Converter 
°C =  Degrees Celsius 
CFU =  Colony Forming Units 
EXPRESS= Expedite the Processing of Experiments to the Space Station 
H2O2 =  Hydrogen Peroxide 
I- =  Iodide 
I2 =  Iodine 
ISS =  International Space Station 
JSC =  Johnson Space Center 
KSC =  Kennedy Space Center 
LED =  Light Emitting Diode 
MCC =  Mission Control Center 
MCD =  Microbial Check Device 
MOD =  Mission Operations Directorate 
MPLM =  Multipurpose Logistics Module 
OSO =  Operational Support Officer 
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ORU =  Orbital Replacement Unit 
PIP =  Package in Place 
PPM =  Parts per Million 
PWD =  Potable Water Dispenser 
QD =  Quick Disconnect 
STS =  Space Transportation System 
SV =  Solenoid Valve 
TIC =  Total Inorganic Carbon 
TOC =  Total Organic Carbon 
TOCA =  Total Organic Carbon Analyzer 
ULF =  Utilization Logistics Flight 
US =  United States 
USOS =  United States On-orbit Segment 
WPA =  Water Processing Assembly 
VCM =  Valve Control Module 
WRS =  Water Recovery System 
I. Background 
 
he ISS PWD primary requirement is to provide potable water to the ISS US crewmembers. The crewmembers 
use the potable water to rehydrate food and drink packages while aboard the ISS. The PWD, located on the ISS 
US Lab, receives 28 Vdc of power from EXPRESS Rack 6. The PWD dispenses potable water in 25 mL increments, 
starting at 25 mL up to 250 mL. The Water Recovery System (WRS) Fuel Cell Water Bus supplies the PWD with 
iodinated water and pressure (14.75 to 30 psig). The pressure from the Fuel Cell Water Bus allows PWD to dispense 
water; the PWD does not contain any pumps to facilitate dispensing. The PWD dispenses both hot and ambient 
water. The hot water dispenses from a different fluid line than the ambient fluid within PWD (see Fig. 1 and 2). The 
PWD receives iodinated water at the PWD inlet, where it flows the iodinated water through the PWD flow path to 
the Quick Disconnect (QD) 3 on the PWD Filter ORU. From here, the water flows through a deiodination filter that 
removes the iodine. The potable water then flows through a 0.2 micron filter to remove any bacteria from the water, 
exiting through QD5 and leaving the PWD Filter ORU. At this point, the water flows through one of two different 
flow paths for either hot or ambient dispense. If ambient dispense, the water flows through Solenoid Valve (SV) 5 
and out through the PWD Needle; roughly 50 mL of tubing. If hot dispense, the water flows through the PWD 
Heater, which warms the potable water via 12 Kapton heater circuits (each circuit containing 3 heater strips). Three 
thermostats control each heater circuit. The hot, potable water exits via SV4 and out through the PWD Needle. The 
volume of the fluid line is roughly 2 L, comprised of the PWD Heater itself and an additional 500 mL in the tubing 
downstream of the heater.  
 
T 
 
Figure 1. PWD Ambient Flow Path 
 
Figure 2. PWD Heated Flow Path 
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II. PWD On-Orbit Issues 
Major PWD On-orbit issues include the following: 
1) Microbial contamination due to system stagnation during shipping, launch preparation, launch, and on-orbit 
installation. 
2) Scenarios surrounding PWD leakage, resulting in inaccurate dispensing, etc. 
3) Scenarios of the PWD under dispensing, resulting in less than desired water amounts. 
A. Microbial Contamination 
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) delivery date requirement for PWD was 6 months prior to the launch of 
STS 126, ULF2 (November 2008). This provided time for installation into the Multipurpose Logistics Module 
(MPLM). Once packing completed and the MPLM closed out, the PWD is installed into the cargo bay of the shuttle. 
The PWD remained stagnant between the time of delivery and activation on the ISS. The crew activated the PWD 
on-orbit at the end of November, by installation into EXPRESS Rack 6 and integration with the new WRS Racks, 
which also delivered on ULF2. The initial checkout of the integrated water systems began at the end of November 
2008. 
Initial checkout began with water quality analysis and microbiology tests on the new ISS water system, including 
water testing from the WRS Racks 1 and 2, Total Organic Carbon Analyzer (TOCA) and PWD. The TOCA has the 
ability to read and analyze the Total Organic Carbon (TOC) and Total Inorganic Carbon (TIC) in potable water 
supplies on ISS, giving an indication of food sources for bacteria growth. Neither TOCA or any other hardware on 
ISS, however, has the capability to read and analyze chemical water quality of a water source. Therefore, detailed 
water quality testing requires the return of on-orbit samples from the water systems to Earth. On-orbit capability 
does, however, allow crewmembers to test real-time samples for bacteria growth in water systems on ISS. The 
microbiological water quality testing capability resides in the Microbial Check Device (MCD), which allows 
crewmembers to flow the water source through a plated media, followed by 48-hr incubation and analysis for quality 
by counting the Colony Forming Units (CFU) within the water. 
After a month of active on-orbit use, the crew tested the PWD for microbial contamination via the MCD. The 
results revealed a count of 85 CFU/mL within the ambient flow path of the PWD. The microbial water quality 
requirement limit for PWD is less than or equal to 50 CFU/mL for potable water. Any higher CFU requires a waiver 
and concurrence from the Space and Life Sciences community at Johnson Space Center (JSC). The crew also tested 
the hot flow path and auxiliary flow path of the PWD. The results revealed no bacterial contamination in either line 
(i.e., 0 CFU/mL).1  
The engineers and scientists who designed the PWD worked to find the cause of the 85 CFU/mL test results. The 
PWD team theorized that problems began during the stagnation of the PWD during the 6 month delivery window. 
The team worked with the JSC Microbiology Lab to keep the system as clean as possible by using the lab 
recommendations for keeping the hardware clean during build and delivery to KSC. The PWD underwent preflight 
disinfection processes on the ground, which included flushing all PWD fluid flow paths with 20 to 30 ppm of iodine 
(I2), a biocide used to kill residual bacteria. The team used a solution of 6 percent hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) to 
disinfect the PWD Filter ORU, containing a 
deiodination filter, 0.2 micron filter, and stainless 
steel tubing (see Fig. 3). Once disinfected, the 
team filled the PWD with sterile deiodinated 
water and delivered it to KSC for stowage in the 
MPLM 
Although the disinfection process appeared 
thorough at the time, the PWD project team 
determined some possible flaws with the 
disinfection process of the PWD Filter ORU and 
the PWD unit itself. Specifically, the dwell times 
used in both disinfection procedures for the PWD 
and the PWD Filter ORU was only 5 minutes.  
The PWD was disinfected with iodine, and the 
Filter ORU was disinfected with H2O2.  During 
PWD troubleshooting for possible causes for 
microbial contamination, the JSC Microbiology 
Lab determined that the dwell times were 
 
Figure 3. PWD Filter ORU  
Deiodination Filter 
Microbial  Filter
QD5QD4QD3
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insufficient for both pieces of hardware, The Microbiology Lab recommended  a  minimum of 1 hr dwell 
disinfection time to achieve a successful disinfection. Since the PWD flight unit will not be reprocessed, this 
realization was too late. However, the team modified the applicable PWD Filter ORU process procedures to correct 
this issue for future flights. The PWD Filter ORU is delivered roughly every 8 months due to life time expiration. 
While these theories explained the root cause of the microbial contamination within the PWD, the crewmembers 
still required immediate remediation, as ISS only had one of two potable water sources available. With the PWD 
unfit for crew consumption, they relied upon the 
Russian potable water source. The PWD team 
suggested a variety of remediation options to swiftly 
accommodate the crew and ISS Program’s needs. 
The quickest and most affordable solution was to 
flush iodinated water from the WRS Fuel Cell 
Water Bus into the PWD, using the PWD Flush 
Iodine Mode, on January 7, 2009 (see Fig. 5). The 
PWD design included this mode in order to have the 
capability to flush biocidal, iodinated water (1 to 4 
ppm I2) into the PWD, bypassing the PWD Filter 
ORU Deiodination Filter by going in through QD4. 
The flush continues through the Microbial Filter and 
downstream of the ambient leg of the PWD. 
Nominally, the ambient leg does not show residual 
biocide in the water (see Fig. 4); it does in this 
mode, due to the Deiodination Filter bypass. 
Although this solution provides hope for 
remediation of the ambient leg of the PWD, the 
PWD team recognized potential issues prior to success. The first known issue was the JSC Microbiology Lab 
determination that the low amount of I2 (1 to 4 ppm) from the Bus was not capable of remediating a known 
contaminated system. This low concentration of I2 was only sufficient to maintain an already clean system. 
Additionally, the team knew prior to delivery of the PWD that I2 was not compatible with the Microbial Filter 
material. The Microbial Filter media is a pleated Nylon 6,6, which absorbs the I2, and desorbs iodide (I-). I2 is 
biocidal, while I- is not; both are harmful from a crew health standpoint. Therefore, in the Flush Iodine Mode, the 
 
Figure 5. PWD Flush Iodine Mode, Ambient 
 
Figure 4. PWD Flush Iodine Mode, Ambient 
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PWD ambient leg (downstream of the PWD Filter ORU) did not see any biocide 
(I2) to remediate the possible contamination in that portion of the leg.  
Despite the known issues, the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) and the 
PWD team tried the flush option, as it was the quickest and most cost-effective 
solution to the PWD contamination issue. After the Flush Iodine Mode took place, 
the crew ran another MCD microbial test, which revealed yet another increase in 
microbial growth. The Flush Iodine Mode did nothing to help remediate the PWD 
contamination issue (see Fig. 5). This method of remediation failed because of a 
low concentration of iodine, in addition to the possibility of a iodine-resistant 
bacterium contamination. 
The PWD team worked on more invasive contamination solutions, given the 
unsuccessful results of the Flush Iodine Mode (250 mL and 1L flushes). The PWD 
needed a stronger concentration of biocide for remediation. The team considered 
alternative chemical concentrations, such as H2O2 and silver.  Due to toxicity and 
safety issues, however, iodine remained the chemical of choice for remediation. 
The PWD team and the Microbiology Lab worked to determine the 
right amount of iodine concentration necessary to remediate the PWD, 
targeting 40 ppm of I2.  
The PWD team needed to determine the ideal delivery method of 
this high concentration of I2 into the on-orbit PWD, including the 
design of supplementary tools required to carry out the task. The team 
decided to deliver the 40 ppm I2 in Teflon bags with a Luer lock 
interface, allowing the chemical to inject into the PWD Microbial 
Filter vent port via a Filter Flush Assembly (see Fig. 6 and 7). The 
basis for the choice of Teflon bags derived from the fact that these 
bags were previously approved by the NASA Materials Analysis and 
Fracture Control group for compatibility with high concentrations of 
I2. The Filter Flush Assembly consists of a female Luer lock, which 
interfaces with the Teflon bag male Luer lock, and a female Swagelok 
at the other end with the ability to connect to the vent port of the PWD 
Microbial Filter, Fig. 8. 
In order to ensure the I2 injection would be successful, the team 
needed to take into consideration the effects of high concentrations of 
I2 injected into the noncompatible filter media. Subsequently, the 
PWD team worked with the JSC Water Quality group to determine the 
amount of flushing required to completely clear out the residual I2 
from the filter after injection. The JSC Water Quality group tested the 
Nylon 6,6 media with 40 ppm of I2 and determined that at least 10 L 
of water must flush through the Micro Filter in order to desorb the 
chemical from the filter media. These results were critical, since the 
Microbial Filter absorbs I2 and desorbs I-, both of which are hazardous 
for crew consumption. The crewmember iodine ingestion limit is 0.02 
mg/L of Iodine, either I2 and I-. 2 The 10 L flush quantity derives from 
the filter ability to desorb I2 and I- under the required crew 
consumption limits. 
In the event that the Microbial Filter did not recover with the 
deiodinated water 10 L flush, the PWD team conceptualized a 
recovery backup plan. The PWD Tube Assembly (Fig. 9) was 
designed to replace the Microbial Filter within the PWD Filter ORU, 
if the filter was not fit for use due to the inability to desorb all the 
highly-concentrated I2. The crew would only use the PWD Tube 
Assembly in worst case scenarios to recover the PWD, since removing 
the PWD Microbial Filter would mean that the water would no longer 
filter bacteria. Therefore, the PWD could still deliver water to the 
crew, but there would always be a risk of illness to a crew member 
 
Figure 7. Filter Flush Assembly 
 
Figure 8. PWD Engineering 
Development Unit. 
(Mocking the iodine injection procedures 
into the PWD Filter ORU Microbial Filter 
vent port.) 
 
Figure 6. Teflon Bag  
filled with 40 ppm I2 
 
Figure 9. PWD Filter Tube Assembly 
(boxed in red) 
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because the Microbial Filter would not be in line for a water dispense.  To date, the PWD Tube Assembly has never 
been used. 
The PWD Disinfection Kit consisted of the Teflon bag of 40 
ppm I2 solution; the PWD Filter Flush Assembly; the PWD Filter 
Tube Assembly; and three extra QD sterile caps for the PWD Filter 
ORU QDs. The QDs caps were delivered to place on the PWD 
Filter ORU QDs in case the Filter was removed from the PWD unit. 
The PWD Disinfection Kit launched on STS-119/15A in March 
2009. The crew used the PWD Disinfection Kit (excluding the 
PWD Filter Tube Assembly) as planned during 15A docked 
operations in March 2009 (see Fig. 10). The initiative was a success 
and the microbial counts from the ambient leg of the PWD dropped 
from 250 CFU/mL to 0 CFU/mL, after the 10 L flush of water. 
Additionally, the PWD desorbed all of the I2 and I- from the 
microbial filter, making the effort a complete success. Since the use 
of the Disinfection Kit, the PWD continues to sustain low bacteria counts. 
B. No Dispense and Water Leakage Scenarios 
On June 6, 2009, the crew reported to Houston Mission Control Center (MCC) that the PWD stopped 
dispensing. One possible cause for a no dispense scenario includes a not fully active Package In Place (PIP) Switch. 
The PIP Switch resides behind the Beverage Adapter (see Fig. 11 and 12). The PIP Switch is a safety feature for the 
PWD, designed to prevent inadvertent dispense. The PIP Switch ensures that a food or drink package is in place 
before a dispense can occur (see Fig. 12). The PIP Switch activates via a plunger on the back of the Beverage 
Adapter, which fully extends when a food or drink package is in place, signaling the switch to allow a dispense to 
occur (see Fig. 13). 
 
 
Figure 10. On-orbit Use of Iodine 
Shock Kit 
 
Figure 13. Back Side of the Beverage Adapter, Beverage Adapter  
Plunger (ORANGE) 
 
Figure 11. PWD Beverage  
Adapter Extended 
 
Figure 12. Behind the Beverage Adapter, 
 PIP Switch 
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To validate the cause for the PWD malfunction, 
the team recommended that a crewmember use their 
finger to lightly press the PIP Switch, which would 
confirm that a dispense could occur with switch 
activation The crewmember reported back that when 
they manually pressed the PIP Switch, the PWD began 
to dispense nominally. This verified why the PWD 
stopped dispensing, but did not establish a root cause 
for the Beverage Adapter Plunger failure to fully 
extend and actuate the PIP Switch. While the team 
continued to investigate the anomaly, the Operational 
Support Officer (OSO) recommended a temporary 
resolution to the problem. The OSO requested the 
crew add a small layer of tape on top of the PIP 
Switch to increase the area between the Beverage 
Adapter Plunger and PIP Switch. This would allow the 
plunger to make contact with the switch and actuate a 
dispense (see Fig. 14). This temporary workaround 
allowed the crewmembers to continue to use the 
Beverage Adapter nominally, while troubleshooting 
continued on the ground. 
Although the temporary workaround was a good 
short-term fix, team concerns remained regarding the 
untested and unknown stresses induced on the PIP 
Switch, due to the off-nominal configuration of the 
layer of tape on the switch. The team requested a 
stress analysis to verify that the tape configuration on 
the switch was safe for continued use. The stress 
analysis found that the life of the PIP Switch 
potentially reduced from 1,000,000 cycles to less than 
5000, if the switch continued in this off-nominal 
configuration. The PWD team created instructions for 
tape removal and a return to nominal switch 
configuration, while continuing to research the length 
of the Beverage Adapter plunger more closely. 
On July 3, 2009, during the Beverage Adapter 
Plunger investigation, the crew reported to Houston 
MCC that the PWD Package Insert Port appeared 
rusty (see Fig. 15) and that the Beverage Adapter 
Slide Assembly was sticking (see Fig. 16). The crew 
took apart the Beverage Adapter Assembly on July 4, 
2009, finding a water leak within the adapter. The 
crew also found apparent food debris or possible 
corrosion around the capture pins on top of the Slide 
Assembly within the Beverage Adapter Assembly (see 
Fig. 17). The PWD team instructed the crew to wipe 
down that area of the assembly with Povidone Iodine 
wipes to remove as much residual debris as possible. 
 
Figure 16. Beverage Adapter Opened, Showing the 
Slide Assembly (RED) 
 
Figure 15. On-orbit photo of PWD Package Insert 
Port with Food Residue/Corrosion within the 
Beverage Adapter the PIP Switch with Tape 
 
Figure 14. Behind the Beverage Adapter  
(PIP Switch with Tape) 
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The PWD team determined that a water leak from the dispense point of the Needle was back-flowing into the 
interior of the Beverage Adapter (see Fig. 18). The off-nominal configuration of the tape on the PIP Switch like 
exacerbated this scenario. The tape on the 
switch did not allow the PWD food and/or 
drink packages to seat properly within the 
Beverage Adapter, leaving a small gap where 
the Needle did not fully insert into the food or 
beverage package (see Fig. 18). With this 
understanding of the water leak within the 
Beverage Adapter, the team finalized the 
procedure to return the PWD to the nominal 
configuration. The procedure tasked the crew to 
lubricate the Beverage Adapter Plunger with 
Braycote 601 and remove the tape from the 
switch. Lubricating the plunger allowed it to 
loosen enough to fully extend and actuate the 
PIP Switch to activate a dispense. The crew 
performed the tasks successfully. The root 
cause for the plunger not fully extending, 
however, remained undetermined. 
On July 15, 2009, a few days after the PWD 
returned to nominal configuration, the crew 
called to Houston MCC to report that they 
continued to notice the Beverage Adapter Assembly sticking; they suspected the issue was still leakage. The PWD 
team advised the crew to open up the Beverage Adapter and clean it every 2 to 3 days to remedy the stickiness and 
residue. This cleaning resulted in a side effect. The Beverage Adapter was not designed to handle repetitive 
 
Figure 18. Beverage Adapter Cross Sectional View,  
Leakage Path (blue arrow) 
 
Figure 17. Precleaning (left) Postcleaning (right): On-orbit Photos of the Food Residue/ 
Corrosion on the Slide Assembly Internal to the Beverage Adapter 
 
Figure 19. Helical Insert location (RED) 
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disassembly for cleaning, as it was not foreseen that a leak would occur in this area. On August 24, 2009, due to 
repetitive off-nominal cleaning of the Beverage Adapter, one of the two locking inserts failed on orbit (see Fig. 19 
and 20). Over-torque during Beverage Adapter reassembly stripped out the helical insert. The Beverage Adapter can 
function with one fastener. If the crew damaged the other insert, however, nothing would hold the two pieces of the 
Beverage Adapter together. The PWD 
team quickly engineered short- and 
long-term solutions to address the 
problem. The short-term solution 
recommended the crew to wrap Kapton 
tape around the parameter of the 
Beverage Adapter. The recommended 
long term solution was for the PWD 
team to redesign and deliver a new 
Beverage Adapter capable of 
withstanding repetitive cleaning. Within 
3 months of the initial request, the 
redesigned Beverage Adapter  was 
delivered to the ISS on ULF3. 
The leak issue is still undergoing 
investigation by the team. The team’s inability to duplicate the leak may stem from the zero gravity atmosphere in 
which the leak occurred. The PWD Needle design is one of the possible causes for the leak. The team found that the 
Shuttle Galley Needle design differed from the PWD Needle design by a small shoulder feature found on the Shuttle 
Galley Needle. (see Fig. 21). It is believed that the shoulder on the Shuttle Galley Needle provides a additional 
sealing surface at the septum interface on the food/drink package, which prevents potential water backflow. Since 
the team could not replicate the leakage found on orbit, the PWD team could only replicated the Shuttle Galley’s 
Needle design, but could not verify that the new Needle design fixed the leakage problem. The newly designed 
PWD Needle, matching the Shuttle Galley Needle, was delivered to ISS on 20A, February 2010. Once the 
redesigned PWD Needle is on orbit, the team will assess whether the theory of the shoulder resolves the leak issue 
with the Beverage Adapter. 
C. Under-Dispense Scenarios 
After several months of nominal use, on-orbit crewmembers began to observe that the PWD was not accurately 
dispensing the proper amount of water during use. In mid-July 2009, ISS occupant Dr. Michael Barrett filmed an on-
orbit calibration study experiment on the PWD. This experiment recorded the results of PWD dispenses for 
quantities at 25, 50, 75, and 250 mL. The test results showed dispense quantities of approximately 60 percent of the 
requested amount. With the under-dispense scenario confirmed by video, a failure investigation began to determine 
root cause for the under-dispense scenario. 
Root cause analysis indicated that a low dispense volume is a function of one of two scenarios (see Fig. 22). 
Possible causes follow: 1) The system pressure is lower than expected at the inlet or there is an internal pressure 
drop to the PWD; and/or 2) there is a malfunction within the flow control of the PWD System electronics. The low 
system pressure could come from the inlet and/or the increased pressure drop within the PWD Flow Loop or the 
 
Figure 21. (Top) PWD Needle, (Bottom) Shuttle Galley Needle 
 
Figure 20. Stripped Helical Insert from the Beverage Adapter  
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PWD ORU Filter. The malfunction in 
the electronics could derive from 
within the PIP Switch, watchdog 
timers and/or the valve control 
module or volume control module.  
The PWD team began the 
troubleshooting investigation by 
analyzing the system pressure and 
comparing it to the known nominal 
inlet pressure of 15 psi (692 mL/min 
flow rate). The on-orbit calculation of 
flow rate was around 240 mL/min. 
This indicated an inlet pressure below 
8 psi to result in such a low flow rate. 
Actual on-orbit WRS Fuel Cell Water 
Bus data indicated a pressure of 19 
psi, which meant an improbable inlet 
pressure root cause. A pressure drop increase due to a possible obstruction is a more likely root cause, due to the 
small orifice of the needle and the close proximity to possible food contamination. An obstruction causing an 
increase in pressure drop across check valves or the solenoid valve is an unlikely root cause, since the diameters are 
3 to 4 times greater than that of the needle diameter. 
The most likely root cause for the 
increase in pressure drop is due to an 
obstruction within the Filter ORU 
Assembly. The under dispensing 
occurred after approximately 8 
months of filter use. This was the 
same Filter ORU that the crew used 
the Disinfection Kit on in March 
2009. The 0.2 micron microbial filter 
can trap debris and even air, which 
means the PWD may become 
obstructed over time, causing blocked 
water flow and an under-dispense 
scenario. 
A fault tree analysis of the PWD 
Flow Control electronics (see Fig. 23) 
shows an early termination of the 
water flow cycle and a reduced 
dispense volume. Dr. Barrett’s video recording of the experiment allowed the PWD team on the ground to observe 
the behavior of the PWD LED lights. Through this observance of how the PWD LED lights responded during 
dispense, the engineers determined the probable/improbable failures within the Flow Control electronics. 
Engineers noticed at the end of every dispense cycle, both of the PWD LEDs (see Fig. 24) stopped blinking and 
went to  steady-state prior to the PIP Switch release. This showed a watchdog timer override, a clear indication that 
the problem was not an early release of the PIP Switch. Observing the start and stop of the blinking LEDs during 
Dr. Barrett’s 250 mL dispense, the lapse time was approximately 30 seconds. The PWD watchdog timer is set at a 
fixed rate of 500 mL/min, which corresponds to the behavior of the LED lights going to steady state at the end of a 
dispense. The LED observation eliminated the volume control watchdog early timeout event as a root cause failure. 
The same manner of PWD LED observation indicated the improbability of an independent watchdog early timeout 
as a root cause, because the controls would not have functioned. (I get it, but this is a lot to digest. You may want to 
add clarification for other readers.) 
Another possible cause included a Valve Control Module (VCM) malfunction. The VCM should only change 
state in response to a command from the watchdog time or volume control module. If the VCM malfunctions, an 
inconsistent dispense volume results, since the module does not have its own timer to consistently terminate a cycle. 
Data showed the dispense at consistently 60 percent less than the nominal dispense volume, ruling out the 
probability of a VCM malfunction and thereby indicating a nominal watchdog abort. 
 
Figure 22. Root Cause Under Dispense Fault Tree 
 
Figure 23. PWD Flow Control Electronics  
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The final leg of the fault tree analysis to be considered was the volume control module (VCM), a part of the 
Flow Control components, If the VCM fails, either the internal 
pressure sensor, the ADC, or the internal flow calculation logic 
failed. Failure of these components would result in one of the 
following: a low delta-pressure reading or a high delta-pressure 
reading. A low delta-pressure reading would result in a calculated 
flow rate lower than actual with a longer dispense time. The 
watchdog timer would abort the cycle with a higher than selected 
dispensed volume. A high-delta-pressure reading would result in 
a calculated flow rate larger than the actual rate, with a reduced 
dispense time. The dispensed volume would be lower, but the 
watchdog would not activate. Neither of these events occurred, 
pointing to the improbability of VCM failure. 
III. Conclusion 
The facts presented in Dr. Barrett’s experiment video of PWD 
dispense accuracy (the pressure data from the Water Bus, 
observed LED lighting responses, and dispensed volume), 
indicate that the most probable cause for the under-dispense 
failure of the PWD is an obstruction somewhere within the PWD 
system. There are indications of an obstruction within the PWD 
Filter ORU Assembly and a high probability of an obstruction 
within the PWD Needle. However, there is a still low probability 
that there is an obstruction within a check valve or solenoid valve. This obstruction condition can result from a 
combination of any of the above-listed probable causes. 
The PWD team gave the crew several troubleshooting courses of action as solutions to the under-dispense issue: 
1) Check the PWD System for obvious visual obstructions, including a pinched water hose; 2) check, clean, or 
replace the needle; and 3) replace the PWD Filter ORU. Although the under-dispense is a nuisance to the ISS crew, 
it is not a safety issue to date. The need to continue to dispense additional times to achieve the desired hydration is 
acceptable.  
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